VI — Made in China in the Late "Twenty-Year Armistice" and During WWII (Part 4): The Three Divine Weapons (2)

1) The People's Liberation Army possessed extraordinarily rich experience with rocket munitions. As early as 1909, the army — then still called the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army — began developing rockets, completing the initial design on the eve of the 1911 Sino-German conflict. Though the development period was not long, these crude early rockets posed a significant threat to the defending garrison at Qingdao. From that moment, rocket munitions took the stage of world military history and have occupied an important role ever since.

Early rockets were limited by the conditions of the time and crudely made — in body materials, explosive payload, propulsion, and fragmentation effect alike. Even compared to the rockets used later in the Battle of Lüshun, they fell far short. This situation changed after 1916. After driving out Imperial Japan and retaking the Three Northeastern Provinces — whose industrial base ranked first in China at the time — the People's Party spent the following year gradually transferring its heavy-weapons research facilities, production equipment, and relevant personnel to Manchuria. The rocket project was among them.

Thereafter, at the Shenyang Precision Instruments Research Institute, the rocket research group codenamed "Dongfeng" (East Wind) began making remarkable progress. Whether in range, accuracy, flight speed, or explosive power, their rockets improved dramatically. By 1920, vehicle-mounted multiple-launch rocket systems had also been successfully developed. By this point, the Dongfeng Group had two major projects under its belt — towed and vehicle-mounted systems — and in the military's estimation, it ranked second only to the "One Hundred" Group (which researched artillery pieces of 100mm caliber and above).

But the Dongfeng Group did not rest on its laurels. Ahead of even the military itself, the group raised a new question: since multiple-launch rocket systems could be clustered, towed by tractors, or mounted on trucks — all of which imposed considerable logistical burden — could they develop a man-portable version? Such a weapon would enhance frontline infantry firepower while also reducing waste (since multiple-launch systems relied on area saturation, precision was less of a concern).

To that end, the Dongfeng Group submitted the project proposal to their superiors. It received high-level attention and reportedly appeared on the Central Military Commission's agenda, ultimately receiving Chairman Chen Ke's personal approval. Funding and personnel were rapidly allocated. The Dongfeng Group spun off a new team, codenamed "PF." According to accounts, this codename originated from Chairman Chen Ke's remarks at the CMC meeting: since they were developing a man-portable rocket, and its primary function would be anti-fortification and anti-armor work, they might as well call it the PF Group — P for Pojia (armor-piercing) and F for Fan-zhuangjia (anti-armor). This also became the origin of the naming convention for the man-portable rocket launchers that followed.

2) The Arduous Road of Design

After the PF Group was established, the first question confronting them was fundamental: what, exactly, should a man-portable rocket launcher look like? As an individual weapon, it clearly could not be as large as vehicle-mounted or towed systems. Weight was subject to strict requirements: under 10 kilograms, ideally around 5.

Next: within a total weight of 10 kilograms, the rocket obviously could not be as large as multi-tube rocket artillery. How, then, should it be propelled?

Assuming propulsion was solved, the minimum effective range — for the safety of the operator — had to be at least 200 meters. How would they achieve that range?

At ranges exceeding 200 meters, how would the rocket maintain accuracy? What accuracy standards should be set?

...

The PF Group found every step of the man-portable rocket design extraordinarily difficult. With no precedent to draw upon, they could only rely on imagination combined with practical engineering realities. For the first three months, the PF Group made virtually no progress.

The breakthrough came three months later. One researcher, browsing through materials he had brought home during the National Day holiday break, happened upon information about the recoilless gun invented by the American Davis during the First World War. Reading about how the Russian Ryabushinsky had used propellant gases to counterbalance recoil, the researcher — while admiring Russian (Soviet) ingenuity — experienced a sudden flash of inspiration: it applied to the man-portable rocket they were developing. He saw how to solve the recoil problem.

The researcher immediately informed the group leader. Using this insight as a starting point, the PF Group finally unlocked the door that had been firmly shut on the project. After two more months of intensive work, they produced the basic prototype of the man-portable rocket launcher.

3) PF40

February 14, 1923 — Western Valentine's Day, the 29th of the lunar month, one day before New Year's Eve. This should have been a time for family reunions at home. But the fifty-nine members of the PF Group, along with two workers from the Jilin Light Alloy Processing Plant (codename: Factory 101), did not go home for Spring Festival. Instead, they traveled to a remote small city in the Northeast: Baicheng. At the time, Baicheng was not yet the world-famous city it would later become — it was still administratively called the Baicheng Prefecture. But the Baicheng Weapons Testing Center, which would become renowned worldwide, was already under construction. The PF Group and the two Jilin plant workers had come to test the just-produced man-portable rocket launcher.

The future PF40's prototype: the PF-1.

The PF-1 already possessed essentially all the components of the future PF40: a launch tube, a warhead (rocket), simple mechanical sights, a grip, and a firing mechanism. Two versions of the PF-1 were brought for testing: a wartime rapid-production version with a launch tube made of ordinary steel and a shaped-charge warhead containing only TNT; and a full version with a high-strength alloy steel launch tube and a warhead containing 800 grams of TNT/RDX mixed explosives.

The test results were quite satisfying. First, both versions fired successfully. Second, the armor penetration was also satisfactory — whether the simplified or full version, destroying an ordinary civilian building was trivial. The full version could breach 100mm of reinforced concrete. Simple fortifications posed no challenge. The sole disappointment was that, because the warhead could not yet be fitted with a propulsion system, a launch charge had to be placed in the tube instead. This limited the PF-1's effective range to only 30 meters, with a muzzle velocity of just 30 m/s.

The successful test gave the PF Group enormous encouragement. Team members redoubled their efforts, and just six months later, the improved PF-2 was developed — not only doubling the range but also improving armor penetration by 30%.

After that, however, the PF Group's development stalled. The reason was simple: significantly improving the warhead's flight distance, muzzle velocity, and stability was virtually impossible without engine miniaturization. PF Group members had many ingenious ideas, including stabilizing fins for flight and tail nozzles to suppress backblast, but all of these required solving the warhead's propulsion problem first. Without that solution, the PF-2's performance could not be improved.

Facing this impasse, the PF Group adopted the simplest and most practical solution: increase the propellant charge. The consequence was that the PF-3's weight increased to 6.8 kilograms. A fully equipped soldier could still carry one PF-3 on the march or in sustained combat. However, many small improvements — including fins — could not be incorporated into the PF-3.

For the military, however, the PF-3's appearance was already an astonishing development. At a time when tanks were still in their infancy, the PF-3 meant the People's Liberation Army's infantry now held an absolute advantage over armor. In theory, a rifle company where every soldier carried a PF-3, upon encountering a tank company of twelve tanks, would achieve a decisive victory. Twelve tanks simply could not withstand nearly one hundred PF-3 rounds.

At the time, voices within the military began arguing for "rocket launchers instead of tanks." Even within the Central Military Commission, some argued that with the PF-3's formidable firepower (100-meter range, 180mm penetration), developing tanks was a waste of resources. The PF Group, upon learning of the armored vehicle research team's existence, once semi-publicly declared that whatever they were researching was "trash" compared to the PF-3. The two groups, driven by their conflicting philosophies ("absolute defense" versus "absolute penetration"), filed formal complaints against each other — complaints that even reached Chairman Chen Ke's desk.

Ultimately, Chairman Chen Ke overruled the opposition and ordered continued tank development: "War is not a math problem. It is not a game. It is not a fair one-on-one duel. Battlefield conditions change in an instant. Tanks possess speed and armor that surpass infantry. Their ability to support the front line and assault fortified positions is beyond what ordinary infantry can match. And besides — are tanks forever limited to these current performance specifications?"

"We need rocket launchers, and we need tanks."

"Rocket launchers and tanks are like spear and shield. I hope both groups will continue to develop their respective strengths. Let the Central Committee see how far each of you can go."

The PF-3's emergence in reality spurred the armored group into action. Within five years, they developed and improved fifteen types of tanks — most notably the 1938 "Panda Tank," which comprehensively outperformed every tank in every other country.

Yet it still could not withstand the PF-3.

Even so, the military remained devoted to its tanks, heaping praise on Chairman Chen Ke's foresight. The reason was simple: each had its purpose. Tanks provided the front line with powerful, sustained firepower and were the masters of assault and breakthrough. Rocket launchers, when both sides' armor clashed, could rapidly destroy enemy tanks and provide crucial support. Spear and shield were not adversaries — used together, they achieved maximum effect.

The PF-3 later received its formal designation of PF40 — not because it was finalized in 1940, but because the PF-3 had been kept strictly classified. One provision of infantry combat regulations stated that when facing a critical battlefield situation, soldiers must destroy their own equipment to prevent it from falling into enemy hands — and the PF-3 topped that list. At the 1940 Grand National Day Parade, to deter foreign powers and bolster the public's confidence (China had already entered the Great War and was fighting multiple nations; domestic pressure was immense), the PF-3 was publicly displayed for the first time. From then on, it bore its formal name: the PF40.